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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2742
___________
CAROL BANGURA, Appellant
vs.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; SYLVESTER JOHNSON; JUDITH DUNNE, Lieutenant,
Badge No. 122 In Her Official Capacity; BEVERLY PEMBROOK, Sergeant, Badge No.
8636 In Her Official Capacity; MARK BROWN, Detective, Badge No. 9270 In His
Official Capacity; CHARLOTTE COUNCIL, Deputy Commissioner Internal Affairs, In
Her Official Capacity; MAURICE STOVALL, In His Official Capacity; MICHAEL J.
HORAN, In His Official Capacity; GLENN ANDREOLA, In His Official Capacity;
JOSEPH MCGILL, In His Official Capacity; THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF
PHILADELPHIA; GERALDINE MYLES, Dr., In Her Individual and Official Capacity;
DALE MATHIS, In Her Individual and Official Capacity; MARIE LITTMAN, In Her
Individual and Official Capacity; GAIL BORDEN KRAUSE, In Her Individual and
Official Capacity; WENDY SHAPIRO, In Her Individual and Official Capacity; PAUL
G. VALLAS, In His Official Capacity; STEPHEN MASCIANTONIO, In His Official
Capacity; LEROY WITT, In His Official and Individual Capacity; LYNN ROMAN, In
Her Individual and Official Capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 07-cv-00127)
U.S.D.J. John R. Padova
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
JULY 23, 2009
Before: CHIEF JUDGE SCIRICA, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2009)

___________
OPINION
___________

PER CURIAM.
Carol Bangura, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
granting the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the following
reasons, we will affirm.
I.
This appeal arises out of a child custody dispute between Carol Bangura
and James Lewis, the unmarried parents of fourteen-year-old R.L. The following facts
are taken from Bangura’s complaint. On January 14, 2005, Philadelphia police officers
arrested Bangura’s minor daughter, R.L., for assaulting her. At that time, Bangura had
primary physical and legal custody of R.L., while Lewis had custody every other weekend
as well as extended periods during the summer. After the arresting officers took R.L. to
the station, they assured Bangura that they would contact her when they were ready to
release R.L. Despite these assurances, however, the police subsequently released R.L. to
Lewis.
When Bangura contacted the station to object, one of the police officers in
charge, Sergeant Beverly Pembrook, advised her to call 911 and report a violation of the
custody order. Bangura followed these instructions, and called 911. Bangura then went
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to Lewis’s home with a copy of the custody order, and waited for the police to arrive.
Soon thereafter, Officers Quinn and Corrigan arrived on the scene. After speaking to
Lewis, however, the officers informed Bangura that he refused to relinquish custody of
R.L. because Bangura had physically and verbally abused her. Officer Quinn informed
Bangura that Lewis was on his way to court in order to obtain a protection from abuse
order. Bangura asked Officer Quinn to call the Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
to investigate these allegations, but the officer denied her request. Bangura then drove to
the police station and met with Lieutenant Judith Dunne, who said that she was
supporting her officers’ actions.
Later that afternoon, Bangura returned to the police station and explained
the situation to Detective Mark Brown. As a result, two officers were instructed to escort
Bangura to Lewis’s residence to retrieve R.L. Lewis, however, again refused to allow his
daughter to leave with Bangura. The officers then advised Bangura to seek recourse in
the courts.
Four days later, on January 18, 2005, Bangura, Lewis, and R.L. appeared in
Juvenile Court for a hearing on the assault charges against R.L. At the hearing, intake
worker Maurice Stovall told the parties that, due to the terms of the custody order, R.L.
had to return home with Bangura. R.L. protested, however, and stated that she wanted to
stay with her father. After conferring with Master Stephen Masciantonio, Stovall
permitted R.L. to go home with Lewis.
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The next day, Lewis filed an emergency protection from abuse petition on
behalf of R.L. At an ex parte hearing on the petition that same day, Master Michael
Horan suspended Bangura’s parental rights, and awarded sole custody of R.L. to Lewis.
The following week, at a Rule to Show Cause Hearing on Master Horan’s order, Master
Glenn Andreola awarded Lewis primary physical and legal custody of R.L.
Approximately six months later, the parties appeared for a custody hearing
in Family Court. After taking testimony from the parties, Judge Matthews issued a
temporary order granting Lewis primary physical custody, awarding Bangura and Lewis
shared legal custody, and allowing Bangura partial custody on alternating weekends.
Judge Matthews also ordered the parties to participate in the Functional Family Therapy
program (“FFT Program”) through the court’s Juvenile Branch. To that end, court
employee Leroy Witt arranged for Bangura and her family to meet with therapist Manson.
Bangura evidently attempted to attend therapy, but soon reported to Witt
that Manson’s behavior at the session was “inappropriate.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 108.)
In response, Witt told Bangura not to return to therapy. At that time, Bangura also spoke
to Lynn Roman, the supervisor of the FFT program, about Manson’s conduct.
In October 2005, Judge Matthews held a second custody hearing. At the
hearing, Witt read into the record a letter from therapist Manson who stated that his
sessions with Bangura had been terminated because she was “profane, inflexible and
abusive toward Mr. Lewis.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 114.) Following the hearing, Judge
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Matthews denied Bangura any additional custody or visitation.
Meanwhile, Bangura filed a complaint in the police department’s internal
affairs unit against Sergeant Pembrook, Lieutenant Dunne, Officers Quinn and Corrigan,
and Detective Brown. In November 2005, Deputy Police Commissioner Council
contacted Bangura to advise her that her complaint was being dismissed. Bangura
claimed that Commissioner Johnson subsequently promised that he would personally
review her complaint, but, according to Bangura, never did so.
II.
Bangura initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against over 30 defendants,
including: (1) the city of Philadelphia ( the “City”); Police Commissioner Johnson,
Lieutenant Dunne, Sergeant Pembrook, Detective Brown, and Deputy Police
Commissioner Council (the “Police Defendants”); and (2) Stovall, Master Masciantonio,
Master Horan, Master Andreola, Witt, Roman, and Joseph McGill, the Director of Case
Management at Family Court (the “First Judicial District Defendants”).1 In the
complaint, Bangura essentially alleged that the defendants’ conduct during the abovedescribed events violated her substantive and procedural due process rights.2 Bangura
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By order entered April 1, 2008, the District Court dismissed Bangura’s claims
against all other defendants. Bangura does not challenge this order on appeal.
2

Bangura amended her complaint twice. For purposes of this appeal, we refer to her
third amended complaint, filed October 22, 2007, as the “complaint.”
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also alleged violations of Pennsylvania law.
In January 2008, the Police Defendants and First Judicial District
Defendants filed a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings. By order entered May 21,
2008, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed all of Bangura’s federal claims
against them. Specifically, the District Court found that: (1) the complaint failed to state
either a substantive or procedural due process claim against the Police Defendants; (2)
Bangura’s claims against the First Judicial District Defendants in their official capacities
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) Bangura’s claims against the First
Judicial District Defendants in their individual capacities were barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine. In light of its dismissal of Bangura’s federal claims, the District Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and dismissed those
claims without prejudice to Bangura’s right to raise them in state court. Bangura sought
reconsideration of the District Court’s order, but the court denied her request. This
appeal followed.
III.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review of an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is
plenary. Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2004). In
reviewing an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff. Turbe v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d
Cir.1991) (holding that when a Rule 12(c) motion alleges plaintiff’s failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, we analyze the motion under the same standard
as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a
motion to dismiss, will be granted if the plaintiff has not articulated enough facts to “raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S.C. 1955, 1965 (2007). Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly
entered judgment on the pleadings against Bangura on each of her claims.
A. Bangura’s Claims Against the First Judicial District Defendants
1.

Claims Against Master Andreola, Master Masciantonio,
Master Horan, Maurice Stovall, and Joseph McGill in their
Official Capacities

Bangura first challenges the District Court’s determination that Master
Andreola, Master Masciantonio, Master Horan, Maurice Stovall, and Joseph McGill were
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because their employer, the First Judicial
District of Philadelphia, is an arm of the state. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Bangura argues that these individuals are not arms of the
state because they are represented by City attorneys. We disagree. We have specifically
held that the First Judicial District, which employs these defendants, is a state entity for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426
F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005). The fact that the City may be paying for legal

7

representation for them does not alter the Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis. See
id. at 240-41. Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Bangura’s claims
against these defendants were barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
2.

Claims against Roman and Witt in their Individual Capacities

Next, Bangura argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her claims
against defendants Roman and Witt in their individual capacities. In the complaint,
Bangura claimed that Witt, the court employee in charge of referrals to the FFT Program,
had inappropriately influenced Judge Matthews’s custody decision by reading therapist
Manson’s letter into the record at the October 2005 hearing. Bangura also alleged that, by
reading the letter in court, Witt had violated the confidentiality agreement governing her
sessions with therapist Manson. Finally, Bangura claimed that both Witt and Roman (the
supervisor of the FFT program), “knew or should have known that the [FFT] program
was not equipped to handle therapy arising out of custodial disputes in which two parties
are litigating for custody,” and “knew or should have known that [therapist Manson] was
not a psychiatrist or licensed therapist.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 111-12.) The District
Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
adjudicate these claims because they were “nothing other than a claim for damages
arising from the October 3, 2005 custody order.” (Dist. Ct. Op. 8).
We agree with the District Court that, to the extent that Bangura was
claiming that Witt improperly influenced Judge Matthews’s custody decision by reading
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therapist Manson’s letter into the October 2005 custody hearing, her complaint must be
directed to that court, not this one. See Desi’s Pizza v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d
411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (instructing that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party who
loses in state court may not bring an action in federal court complaining of injuries caused
by the state court judgment). Furthermore, to the extent that Bangura alleged that Witt
and Roman were negligent for: (1) referring her to the FFT Program because an
unlicensed therapist was “not equipped to handle” her family’s dispute, and (2) breaching
her confidentiality agreement with therapist Manson, (Third Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 111-12,
190-93), the District Court properly dismissed this claim without prejudice to Bangura’s
right to assert it in a state court action.
B.

The Police Defendants

Next, Bangura alleges that Lieutenant Dunne, Sergeant Pembrook,
Detective Brown, and Deputy Police Commissioner Council were negligent in failing to
protect her right to custody of R.L. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 158-62.) The District Court
was not required to exercise jurisdiction over these state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367.
Bangura further alleges that Commissioner Johnson failed to train
employees of the Philadelphia Police Department how to properly handle custody order
violations and child abuse allegations. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 179.) In order to state a
claim against Commissioner Johnson under § 1983, Bangura was required to allege facts
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demonstrating that the Commissioner had personal involvement in the allegedly deficient
training. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that
“[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior”).
Because Bangura failed to allege any such facts, this claim was properly dismissed.
Bangura also attempted to make out a municipal liability claim under
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on this failure-to-train
theory. Specifically, Bangura alleged that the City “failed to train the employees of the
Philadelphia Police Department named in this complaint to handle allegations of child
abuse in accordance with Pennsylvania state law and the release of minor children when a
custody order exists.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 177.) Bangura further alleged that “it is the
custom and practice of the Police Department to inappropriately handle custody order
violations.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 178.)
These allegations are not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the City
of Philadelphia. Although a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for establishing a
policy or custom that results in a constitutional violation, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91,
Bangura did not allege any facts to support an inference that the City of Philadelphia
follows a deficient policy with respect to child custody disputes; she did not identify the
City’s policy on child custody disputes, or set forth any other facts that would suggest an
absence thereof. To the contrary, Bangura’s complaint contains merely conclusory and
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speculative accusations.
IV.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.3
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In her brief, Bangura does not appear to challenge the District Court’s June 3, 2008
order denying her motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the District
Court’s order, and, for the reasons stated by the District Court therein, conclude that the
motion was properly denied.
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